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In this paper, we analyse competition among jurisdictions to attract ﬁrms through low taxes on 
capital and/or high level of public goods, which enhance ﬁrms’ productivity. We assume that the 
competing jurisdictions are diﬀerent in (population) size and that the mobility of capital is costly. 
We ﬁnd that for moderate mobility costs, small economies can attract foreign capital if they 
supply  higher  levels  of  public  goods  than  larger  jurisdictions,  without  being  tax  havens.  If 
mobility costs are high, we recover the classical result that small jurisdictions are attractive to 
foreign capital if they engage in tax dumping. Finally, we show that there exists a subset of 
mobility costs for which the diﬀerentiation in public goods across jurisdictions is not able to relax 
tax competition. 
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In this paper, we analyze competition among countries to attract entrepreneurs
through low taxes on capital and/or high level of public goods, which enhance
rms' productivity. We assume that the competing jurisdictions are dierent
in (population) size and that the mobility of capital is costly. Our main in-
terest is to investigate which type of country (small or large) is attractive to
foreign investments and which instrument (taxes or public goods) is chosen
by the successful jurisdiction.
Tax competition among countries to attract entrepreneurs or mobile shop-
pers has generated a large body of literature. Two topics have attracted par-
ticular attention. Firstly, the focus has been on the ineciencies originated
by capital mobility, which constitute the normative approach to tax com-
petition (see for instance Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1995),
Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Wildasin (1988ab), Bucovetsky (1991), Bucov-
etsky and Wilson (1991), Matsutmoto (1998), Bucovetsky, Marchand and
Pestieau (1998)). A second topic of interest has been the study of the char-
acteristics1 that a country should possess to be the destination of investors
and foreign consumers (Wilson, 1991, Kanbur and Keen (1993), Barros and
Cabral (2000)), Bjorvatn and Eckel (2005), Hauer and Wooten (1999)). In
this paper we adopt a similar positive approach rather than a normative
one by focusing on the role of the size asymmetry of countries in attracting
foreign investments.
A result which generally appears in the tax competition literature is that
small jurisdictions benet from low taxes. This comes from the fact that
small countries face more elastic tax bases than larger countries, if tax rates
were uniform (Hindriks and Myles (2006), Wilson (1991), Kanbur and Keen
(1993)). Another argument that supports this feature is the homogeneity of
population in small countries. Namely, wealthy individuals migrate to small
jurisdictions in which they are able to democratically choose low taxes for
themselves (Hansen and Kessler (2001)).
Importantly, if small countries were always to oer lower capital tax rates
than the larger ones, then they would be importers of capital and exhibit a
high capital-labor ratio. Marceau, Mongrain and Wilson (2007) use data
from 1991 to 1999, to show that this is not the case, and they claim that
1For example, the level of employment, population density, production technology,
taris and subsidies.
2"the correlation between the size-population of a country and
its tax rate is not clear. For example, some large countries like
France and Germany have below average tax rates. (...) [T]he
predictions of the asymmetric tax competition literature do not
appear to be realized in the real world equilibrium." (Marceau,
Mongrain and Wilson, 2007, pages 4-5).
Furthermore, recent data (Devereux et al, 2008) of eective corporate
taxes show that some small countries like Belgium, Netherlands or Serbia
set very low tax rates, even lower than countries of smaller size as Luxem-
bourg. Some medium-sized countries like Austria set high rates as some
large countries. Large countries are also divided in clusters of high taxes
(Argentina, China, Russia, US, France) and low taxes (Bulgaria, Ukraine,
Poland). Therefore, the evidence is that there is no monotonic increasing re-
lationship between capital tax rates and the population size of jurisdictions.
The model we develop in our paper allows for a non-monotonic pattern
of capital tax rates by assuming that countries of unequal size compete for
foreign capital with taxes and public goods that improve rms' productivity.
The existing literature has already analyzed the role of public goods dif-
ferentiation in relaxing scal competition (Zissimos and Wooders, 2008 and
Hindriks et al, 2008). Accordingly, tax rate dierentials between competing
jurisdictions may persist in equilibrium. In the same vein, the stratication
of countries in dierent tax classes can be explained by the quality dieren-
tiation of public goods (Justman, van Ypersele and Thisse, 2001). B enassy-
Qu er e et al (2007) also study joint competition on taxes and the provision of
public goods that enhance consumers' utility and rms' productivity. They
nd in particular that both the amount of public R&D expenditures as a
share of GDP and the road infrastructure had a positive impact on FDIs
owing from the United States to European countries in 1994-2003.
In our model we consider two jurisdictions of uneven size, where size
refers to population in a given jurisdiction2. There is a one to one relation-
ship between a rm, an entrepreneur/worker and a unit of capital (productive
2Country size may be dened by its population, by its area, or by its national income
(Streeten, 1993). In our paper, we focus on the population aspect rather than on the
spatial size.We thus assume that spatial area will not be a physical limitation for newly
established rms. We further focus on competition between jurisdictions that highly dier
in size. Accordingly, we assume that when the population size is very small, it is likely
that the endowment in human capital and entrepreneurs is very limited.
3resource), and entrepreneurs are heterogeneous according to their willingness
to invest capital in a foreign location. Public goods that cover a wide range
of infrastructures, services and regulations provided by the local and/or the
central government are attractive to rms if they enhance their productiv-
ity3. Accordingly, entrepreneurs decide where to locate capital according to
dierentials in oered public good levels and tax dierentials. Competition
between jurisdictions follows a two-stage game. First, governments decide
on the level of public goods to supply, and then they set the tax rates to
maximize their rents. This timing leads to a strategic eect of public good
provision on tax competition intensity, because jurisdictions can anticipate
in the rst stage how harsh competition on taxes will be in the second stage.
The main ndings are summarized as follows. A large jurisdiction can
only be attractive to capital through the supply of higher levels of public
goods than its small rival. Nevertheless, such a result only emerges if the
mobility cost of capital is very low. Importantly, a small jurisdiction need not
be a tax haven to be attractive to foreign investments. Indeed, for a certain
range of mobility costs, it attracts foreign capital by supplying higher public
goods than its larger rival without bidding lower taxes. For this equilibrium
to occur we show that the cost level of mobility has to be intermediate and
that no comparative advantage specic to small country size is necessary.
However, adopting a tax haven behavior is a winning strategy for a small
country if the mobility cost of capital is high enough. In this case, we recover
the classical result that small countries are capital importers because of low
taxes. Three general conclusions can be drawn: (i) The level of taxation
on capital is not a sucient measure for attractiveness. (ii) High taxes on
capital may persist because of the high level of public goods supplied to
attract capital. (iii) Other things being equal, the model nally shows that a
certain degree of size asymmetry between jurisdictions is sucient to dene
the direction of capital movements.
3In this context, we may consider transportation infrastructures, universities and public
R&D investment, but also property rights enforcement, capital market regulations, labor
and enviromental regulations and the absence of red tape procedures. It follows that
countries' ability to attract foreign investment may also be attractive for the quality of
their institutions. In the Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship (2007), it is argued that
the abundance of entrepreneurs in a country depends, among other factors, on the exis-
tence of regulations, property rights, accounting standards and disclosure requirements.
Furthermore, in recent years there has been a surge of country and cross-country studies
relating economic development to institutions, especially those aecting capital market
development and functionality (La Porta et al. (1997) among others).
4Findings related to our paper can be found in Hindriks, Peralta and We-
ber (2008) and Zissimoss and Wooders (2008). Zissimos and Wooders (2008)
address the ineciency issues that may arise when jurisdictions compete
both on taxes and public investments. They show that competition in public
goods makes competition in taxes less erce but has negative consequences
for eciency. We show that this impact on the intensity of tax competition
may not always be true, since it depends on the size asymmetry of the com-
peting jurisdictions and on the mobility cost of capital. Hindriks, Peralta
and Weber (2008) also develop a model of tax and public goods competi-
tion with perfect capital mobility. Their aim is to investigate equalization
schemes in federal states. They assume that jurisdictions are dierent in
attractiveness because one possesses a superior production technology. This
asymmetry can be altered by public investments. The authors nd that a
region can be attractive to capital even if its capital taxes are higher than
its rival but its level of equilibrium investment is not ecient as in Zissimos
and Wooders (2008). In both papers, ineciency arises because jurisdictions
make investment decisions at the rst stage of the game and then compete
in taxes. Hence, to make tax competition less erce, jurisdictions invest
ineciently in public goods. We share with this paper the fact that scal
choice is inecient because of the strategic eect of public goods levels on
tax competition intensity. However, the purpose of our paper is dierent.
Other contributions also deal with competition for capital between asym-
metric jurisdictions. For example, Barros and Cabral (2000) consider a sub-
sidy game between asymmetric countries to attract foreign direct investments
in order to alleviate unemployment. At equilibrium, the winner is the coun-
try that gains the most in terms of employment for given transportation
costs. Hauer and Wooten (1999) also consider competition for foreign in-
vestments by stressing the role of international trade costs and the "home
market" eect. Since the authors consider asymmetric sized home markets,
the large country will have an advantage in attracting foreign capital. In
both papers, a small economy can only be attractive to foreign investments
if it underbids the larger one in terms of taxes or if it overbids it in terms of
subsidies. In our paper however, we show that the small country can win in
interjurisdictional competition without being tax attractive.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model
and denes the SPN equilibria of the two stage game. Section 3 presents
the properties of such equilibria. Section 4 deals with attractiveness, while
section 5 presents some eciency issues. Section 6 concludes.
52 The model
Consider two jurisdictions h and f of uneven size. The term jurisdiction
refers indistinguishably to dierent regions of the same country or to dier-
ent countries provided that these entities have the power to tax. As already
mentioned, size refers to the magnitude of population which coincides with
the number of capital-owners who are at the same time entrepreneurs and
workers (one individual per rm). The types of capital-owners in h (resp.
f) are represented by the [0;1]-interval with density sh (resp. sf in country
f), sh + sf = 1. Assume without loss of generality that h is the small juris-
diction, so sh < 1
2: The population of capital-owners4 is thus sh in the small
country and sf in the large one. We further assume that the entrepreneurs
are endowed with one unit of a capital good and that they dier in their will-
ingness to invest abroad. So we assume that capital-owners are distributed
over [0;1] in an increasing order of their willingness to invest at home.
The technology is dened as follows. Each entrepreneur is able to combine
one unit of capital good with her own labor to produce q + ai , (i = h;f)
units of a nal good, where q is the private component of (gross) productivity.
This output good is sold in a competitive (world) market at a given price
normalized to one. Assuming that both countries have equal access to a
common market implies that the smallest jurisdiction does not suer from a
reduced home market. We further suppose that the unit production cost is
constant and equal to zero without loss of generality.
The fraction ai (i = h;f) of the produced good depends on a public input
supplied by jurisdiction i = h;f. This input may represent material and
immaterial public infrastructures5. We further assume that one additional
unit of the public service produces one additional unit of the private good.
It follows that ai also represents the amount of public input supplied by
jurisdiction i = h;f. Providing rms localized at i = h;f with this public
4These exogenously given populations will not change since we consider entrepreneurs
as commuters.
5The public input ai satises the local public good characteristic, which means that it
is jointly used without rivalry by rms located in the same jurisdiction. It follows that the
benets and the costs of these good only accrue at the jurisdictional level. As in Zissimoss
and Wooders (2008), we shall abstract from congestion costs . Taking account of congestion
would complicate our framework without improving qualitatively the results. Moreover,
if ai represents immaterial public goods as law and regulations (protecting intellectual
property, specifying accurate dispute resolution rules,...), the absence of congestion is
easily justied by the particular nature of these goods.
6input is costly. The corresponding cost function is given by C(ai) = a2
i
(i = h;f).
Assume now that an entrepreneur of type x;x 2 [0;1]; either invests
one unit of physical capital in her country i, or she invests in the foreign
jurisdiction j. If she invests in her home country, her prot is given by
i = q + ai   ti, where ti denotes the tax in country i levied on one unit of
capital6. If she invests abroad (country j), her prot becomes q + aj   tj
minus kx; which is the disutility of investing abroad given her type xi. The
coecient k represents a unit cost of moving capital abroad. This parameter
can also be interpreted as a measure of the degree of international integration.
We will see that the value of k is critical in explaining how each country
adjusts its attractiveness by being more tax and/or public-service attractive.
From now on we assume without loss of generality that investments ow
from jurisdiction i to j. For that purpose consider that the capital-owner of
type xi is indierent between investing abroad and staying at home if





[(aj   ai) + (ti   tj)]: (1)
In other words, country j attracts capital from jurisdiction i if the net
gain of investing in j, i.e. aj   tj; is higher than the net gain obtained by
staying in jurisdiction i, ai   ti; after taking into account the mobility cost.
Attractiveness of jurisdiction j can be decomposed in two dimensions: tax
attractiveness t = ti   tj and public goods attractiveness, a = aj   ai.
Denition 1 A jurisdiction is tax attractive if it levies the lowest level of
taxes on capital compared to other jurisdictions.
Denition 2 A jurisdiction is public goods attractive if it supplies the high-
est level of public good services compared to other jurisdictions.
From equation (1) it also follows that the rms belonging to the types in
the interval [0;xi] will move abroad. In other words, sixi entrepreneurs will
move sixi units of capital from country i to country j: It follows that there
6For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that q is such that the prot of each rm
is positive for all equilibrium level of public goods and taxes.
7are four scenarios for representing the tax bases of the capital exporting and
capital importing countries
Country Capital exporting (i) Capital importing (j)
Small (h) sh   shxh sh + (1   sh)xf
Large ( f) (1   sh)   (1   sh)xf (1   sh) + shxh
Jurisdictions are assumed to maximize their tax revenue net of public
investment cost. According to the above table, the payo function of the
capital exporting jurisdiction i (i = h;f) is
Bi(ai;aj;ti;tj) = si(1   xi)ti   a
2
i: (2)
For the capital importing jurisdiction j (j = h;f) we have
Bj(ai;aj;ti;tj) = [(1   si) + sixi]tj   a
2
j (3)





























The two jurisdictions play a two stage game. First, they decide on the
quantity of public goods to provide. Then they select the level of taxes.
The choice of sequentiality follows from the rule that the most irreversible
decision has to be taken rst. The game is solved through backward induc-
tion. Given the couple (k;si);i = h;f , the SPNE of the game is dened as
(ai(k;si);aj(k;si);ti(k;si);tj(k;si)) for i;j = h;f;i 6= j:
2.1 The tax game
Each jurisdiction maximizes its budget with respect to its own tax rate,
assuming that its rival's tax is given and the level of public services is xed





































Clearly, taxes are strategic complements and best reply functions have slopes




















Notice the negative strategic eect of public good provision of country j on
the tax rate of country i; and vice versa. This means that each jurisdiction
has an incentive to dampen its own investment on public goods to restrain
the incentive of the rival jurisdiction to engage in a tax cutting behavior.
This is similar to Hindriks et al (2008) and Zissimos and Wooders (2008)
who show that public goods will be supplied ineciently.









[k(1 + si)   siaj]ai +
1
9ks










[k (2   si)   siai]aj +
1
9ksi
[k (2 + si)   siai]
2 :
2.2 Competition in public goods























In the following, we assume that 9k   si > 0 (k >
si
9 ). Accordingly, the






















3k(2   si)   si
9k   2si
(9)


















Remembering the concavity condition, the above equilibrium values are positive
if
sh
9 < k <
sh
3(2 sh) or k >
sh
3(1+sh) for i = h; and
1 sh





3(1+sh) if i = f. For these parameter values, the equilibrium of the game
is unique because the best replies in each stage of the game satisfy uniqueness
conditions.
At equilibrium we see that a
j   a
i = k





j) have the same sign, it can easily be checked that a
j   a
i > 0 and
t
j   t
i > 0 if k > 2




9k 2sh (1   2sh) > 0 if k > 2
9sh and for i = f, we get a
h a
f = k
9k 2sf (1   2sf) <
0 if k > 2
9sf . From both cases it follows that the small country adopts a tax
haven behavior (t
f > t
h) and supplies lesser public goods than its larger rival
(a
h < a
f) if k > k = 2
9si. By contrast, if k < k the small country switches
to a quite opposite behavior. It follows that the classical result according
to which small countries are tax havens hinges on the condition that capital
10mobility has to exceed a trigger value k; which decreases with the degree of
size asymmetry between the competing jurisdictions.
Proposition 3 The smaller jurisdiction behaves as a tax haven if the cost
of capital mobility exceeds the trigger value k = 2
9si. However, if capital
mobility is high enough (k < k), the smaller jurisdiction oers more capital
goods than its rival and ceases to be a tax h(e)aven7 .
Nevertheless, the above proposition says nothing about countries' attrac-
tiveness to foreign capital. For that purpose we need to analyze the direction
of capital movements. We thus substitute the equilibrium values of tax rates




(1   2si)(si   3k)
si (9k   2si)
; i = h;f
It follows that 0 < x
h < 1 if
sh
3(1+sh) < k <
sh
3 ; while 0 < x
f < 1 if
k >
1 sh
3 or k <
1 sh
3(2 sh). We can then state the following
Lemma 4 The capital importer is the large country f (x










The capital importer is a small country (x































is not empty, we cannot univocally determine
which country, the large or the small, is the destination for FDIs8.
7We borrow this termonology from Hansen and Kessler (2001).
8The overlapping of sets does not lead to two-way ows. In fact, the types of en-
trepreneurs in one jurisdiction dier by their willingness to move abroad, but the set of
types is the same across jurisdictions. Therefore, given the equilibrium quantities of public
goods and taxes for each jurisdiction, there is only a one-way migration ow. In other
words, if xisi entrepreneurs decide to invest in j; it is not possible, that for the same
parameters (si;k); there are entrepreneurs quitting j:
11Indeed for each value k belonging to this intersection, we obtain two
competing equilibria. One for (sh;k) and one for (1 sh;k)9. In the rst case,
the big country is the destination for FDIs, while in the second case foreign
investments ow to the small country. The source of this indeterminacy
resides in the size asymmetry of the competing jurisdictions. Indeed it is easy
to check that 
 = ? if 0  sh < 1
4. It follows that, other things being equal,
size dierence between jurisdictions may matter in dening the direction of
FDIs. From now on, we assume that sh will be small enough in order to
eliminate this indeterminacy. Accordingly, the intervals given in Lemma 4





















10. It thus follows that very small jurisdictions may not
import capital if capital mobility is high enough unless these jurisdictions
enjoy a specic comparative advantage11.
At this stage, the nature of attractiveness for capital (because of tax or
public goods attractiveness) in each set of equilibria is not precised. This
issue will be addressed in the following section.
Finally, for sake of clarity, we present in Fig 1 the sets of parameters
(k;si) which generate dierent pattern of capital movements. The yellow col-
ored areas show the parameter domains where there are international capital
movements (xh > 0 or/and xf > 0): For the parameter values corresponding
to the white areas there are no capital ows between jurisdictions (xh = 0
and xf = 0). Finally, in the grey areas parameter values are not admissible
since positiveness, boundary and concavity conditions are not met in these
subsets.
9More exactly, we have a unique equilibrium for (sh;k) and another unique equilibrium
corresponding to (1   sh;k):
10For sake of completeness, notice that in the intervals we excluded in Lemma 4, either
there is no capital ow, or the whole capital emigrates (xi = 1). Indeed, consider the








3) there are no foreign investments at all (x





; we have the extreme case in which all the entrepreneurs move from h to
f. In this interval, the small jurisdiction produces no public goods ( ah  0) and levies
no taxes (th  0): Similar arguments apply, mutadis mutandis, when si = sf .
11Small economies are likely to have greater cohesion and thus social exibility and
openness to change. These attributes create conditions of political and social stability
and absence of bureaucratic red tape, which may give very small economies a comparative
advantage in attracting foreign rms (Streeten, 1993).
12Figure 1: Equilibrium sets
3 Tax vs. public goods attractiveness
In this section, we show that there exist equilibria where small and/or large
jurisdictions may be attractive to foreign capital not necessarily due to tax
motives. Proposition 3 shows that large jurisdictions can be tax h(e)avens
and small ones can be tax hells. This section is intended to provide a better
understanding of these possible outcomes and, more generally, to precise the
13type of equilibrium strategies the attractive jurisdiction chooses.
Recall that Kanbur and Keen (1993) argue that a small jurisdiction always
xes lower taxes than a larger one because it faces a greater potential of cross
border shoppers and is thus confronted with a more (tax) elastic demand (if
tax rates were identical). It also follows that the small country will be the
capital importer since, by assumption, tax advantages are the only reason
for investing abroad. In our model, jurisdictions face the following capital






((aj   ai) + (ti   tj))

; (12)





((aj   ai) + (ti   tj))

(13)


























k ((aj   ai) + (ti   tj))
 (15)
Assume that taxes are equalized and public goods levels are not dierent
(ti = tj = t; aj = ai). The small country, say i; will face the most elastic
capital supply since jhj = t




12: We thus recover the case
of Kanbur and Keen (1993). We do not get such a univocal result if we
now assume that jurisdictions oer dierent public good levels (aj 6= ai).
Assume that the small jurisdiction has a competitive advantage in terms of
public inputs ( ah   af > 0) and i = f and j = h. If this advantage is
suciently high (ah   af > ~ a =
1 2sh









k(ah af)) for th = tf = t. This creates an incentive for the
large jurisdiction to cut its taxes. Hence, small jurisdictions can be tax hells,
or large jurisdictions can be tax h(e)avens, because tax elasticity of capital
supply can be altered by the dierence ai   aj:
Let us now analyze the relative importance of taxes and public goods in
explaining why a jurisdiction may be attractive to foreign capital. We rst
12We get the same result if i = f while j = h since jhj = t
k
sf
1 sf > jfj = t
k:
14consider when the large jurisdiction is successful in winning the attractiveness
game. The following proposition results.
Proposition 5 If a large jurisdiction imports foreign capital, it is only be-
cause it is attractive in terms of public goods.
Proof. Consider the rst part of the Lemma (4). Since foreign investment

























, the small country's best
tax strategy is to undercut the large country at equilibrium. This result
is reminiscent of Keen and Kanbur (1993), but with the proviso, that the
small country is not successful in attracting foreign investments even if it en-
gages in tax haven behavior. The reason is that the large country's relative
attractiveness in terms of public inputs outweighs the small country's tax
attractiveness. The intuition underlying this aggressive reaction in terms of
public goods provision may be explained as follows. At equilibrium, the ju-
risdiction f considers that capital mobility is high enough to pose a threat for
potential tax base losses. In fact, when mobility is high, the small jurisdiction
faces an elastic capital supply, which induces a tax cutting behavior. Conse-
quently, the large country has an incentive to react strongly by supplying a
much higher level of public goods than its rival.
This behavior can explain the persistence of high taxes in big jurisdictions.
Indeed, high level of taxation may be essential for those countries to be able
to supply high level of public services to attract foreign capital. This result is
the same as in Zissimos and Wooders (2008) but the mechanism is dierent.
As far as small jurisdictions are concerned, we may state the following
results
Proposition 6 A small jurisdiction is attractive to foreign investors:
(i) in terms of public goods, notwithstanding its high taxes if the level of
mobility cost is moderate; and
(ii) in terms of taxes, notwithstanding its low public goods supply if the
level of mobility cost is high.
15Proof. Consider the second point of Lemma (4). Since foreign investment
stems from the big jurisdiction f; si = sf = 1   sh,


























big jurisdiction undercuts its small rival in taxes but is not successful in
attracting foreign capital. For this range of values, the small country faces
an elasticity of capital which is not as large as in the high mobility range.
Its incentive for tax dumping is therefore tempered. On the other hand, in
face of intermediate mobility costs, the large country has weak incentives to
supply high levels of public goods. The balance of these two forces is that the
small jurisdiction counteracts its rival by supplying a much higher level of
public goods. This appears by looking at the elasticity (see (15)) faced by the
small jurisdiction as a capital importer (h = j). Indeed, if the dierential
in public goods is high enough (ah  af > 0), the small jurisdiction alters its
perceived elasticity to such an extent that it does not need to undercut its
rival's tax.





), the tax base is captive
enough to lead the large jurisdiction to select high taxes, inducing the small
one to be a tax h(e)aven. In other words, the small jurisdiction opts for
tax-cutting because its rival sets high taxes.
To summarize our results, (i) a tax hell can be attractive to foreign rms
and (ii) small jurisdictions can be tax hells as well as tax h(e)avens, according
to the degree of international integration.
Finally, we ask if higher international dierentiation in public goods will
reduce the intensity in (capital) tax competition. Derivating 
a and 
t
with respect to k shows that there is no monotonic relationship13 between

a and 










positive or negative. Thus, in the considered interval for k, higher mobility
leads jurisdictions to dierentiate in public goods, but tax dierentials may
not move in the same direction since a higher k can cause a reduction in





jurisdiction may need to increase relatively to its small rival its level of public
goods and decrease its taxes to contain the outow of entrepreneurs. This
strategic move leads to a higher 
a and a smaller 
t. For all other admissible
13The derivates are given in Appendix 1.
16sets of k; higher capital mobility (lower k) entices jurisdictions to dierentiate
(higher 
a) and tax competition is less intense (higher 
t).
Proposition 7 There exists a range of k values such that an increase in
capital mobility increases tax competition even if jurisdictions dierentiate
in public goods.
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between country size (population)
and attractiveness to international capital. Attractiveness is built through
public goods or services that improve rms' productivity and low taxes on
capital. Entrepreneurs face dierent costs of mobility according to their
willingness to locate their capital in a foreign country. We show that when
the mobility cost is low or moderate, a jurisdiction can only be attractive
through the supply of higher levels of public goods and not through lower
taxes. However, adopting a tax haven behavior may only be a winning
strategy if the mobility cost is high enough. Another important conclusion is
that small jurisdictions may attract international capital by supplying a high
level of public goods and without being tax havens. For this equilibrium to
occur we show that the cost level of mobility has to be intermediate and that
no comparative advantage specic to small country size is necessary.
This paper can be extended along dierent lines. One extension would be
to develop a dynamic model of repeated games to capture a possible learning
eect of governments concerning the self-selection of entrepreneurs. It would
also be interesting to introduce labor or dierent types of capital to control
for dierent degrees of mobility in order to check the eects of preferential
taxation, namely, the switch of the burden of taxes on less mobile factors.
175 Appendix

































(2si 9k)2 sh : The sign of the last




0. This implies k > 4


















@k < 0: Hence, when the big or the small jurisdiction
are attractive because of the high level of public goods they provide, there
is comovement in tax and public goods attractiveness when capital mobility
increases.





a > 0 and 
t > 0; remember that
entrepreneurs emigrate from jurisdiction f to avoid high taxes. Derivating


































@k < 0 and
@
t
@k > 0:In this case, there is no more comovement in tax and
public goods attractiveness when capital mobility increases.
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